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RIGHTS AND RIGHT-WING LAWYERS
Michael A. Magee*
AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES: THE FEDERALIST
SOCIETY AND THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION. (OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS 2015). PP. 264. HARDCOVER $31.95.
JEFFERSON DECKER, THE OTHER RIGHTS REVOLUTION: CONSERVATIVE
LAWYERS AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS 2016). PP. 298. HARDCOVER $105.00. PAPERBACK
$29.95.

Scholarship on the post-New Deal American right has proliferated in recent years.
Given the current political landscape, such an explosion in popularity could not be more
timely or vital. Amanda Hollis-Brusky’s Ideas with Consequences: The Federalist Society
and the Conservative Counterrevolution and Jefferson Decker’s The Other Rights
Revolution: Conservative Lawyers and the Remaking of American Government present
two novel additions to this burgeoning literature. Rather than emphasizing the role of the
timeless dynamics of conservative ideology or business elites as the key players animating
the rise of new conservatism, as works on the new right have done in recent years, 1 both
authors instead look to a woefully under analyzed group: conservative lawyers and their
professional organizations. In this review, I first summarize the arguments of each work.
I then put the works into conversation with each other, which reveals the weaknesses and
strengths of each and demonstrates how they contribute to the broader literatures in
American political development and studies of the new American right.
In Ideas with Consequences, Hollis-Brusky looks to the Federalist Society – a
professional association and network of conservative law students, practicing attorneys,
and judges – as the lynchpin and catalyst for much of the new right’s political agenda and
theories of jurisprudence. Adapting a concept from international relations scholarship,
Hollis-Brusky calls the Federalist Society a “Political Epistemic Network” (“PEN”) or “an

* Michael A. Magee is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Oregon.
His research focuses on the ideological and discursive dynamics of contemporary conservative social movements
in the United States.
1. For paradigmatic examples of each, respectively, see COREY ROBIN, THE REACTIONARY MIND:
CONSERVATISM FROM EDMUND BURKE TO SARAH PALIN (2013), and KIM PHILLIPS-FEIN, INVISIBLE HANDS:
THE BUSINESSMEN’S CRUSADE AGAINST THE NEW DEAL (2010).
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interconnected network of professionals with expertise or knowledge in a particular
domain.”2 According to Hollis-Brusky, the statement of purpose of the Federalist Society,
“the state exists to preserve freedom, that the separation of governmental powers is central
to our Constitution, and that it is emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to say
what the law is, now what it should be,”3 encapsulates its status as a PEN because it
contains four key characteristics: (1) a shared set of normative commitments by which
society ought to be organized, (2) a shared understanding of the practical (causal) means
by which to achieve those normative ends, (3) shared interpretations of externally
contested sources of validity (in this case, a shared originalist hermeneutic of the U.S.
Constitution), and (4) a shared set of policy prescriptions to achieve the group’s political
vision.4 Hollis-Brusky organizes the empirical chapters of her book, analyzing the political
issues central to the Federalist Society including revisionist readings of the Second and
Tenth Amendments, around this theoretical edifice to argue that the Federalist Society
generated the resources, provided necessary accountability over judges, and created the
broader political conditions necessary to revolutionize American jurisprudence and, by
extension, American politics writ large.
Drawing on her previous work, Hollis-Brusky argues that much of the influence of
the Federalist Society on the courts can be traced to its ability to provide “intellectual
capital” to conservative justices who challenge longstanding liberal precedent. The chapter
concerning revisionist interpretations of the Second Amendment provides a clear example
of this dynamic. The Federalist Society took up the cause outlined in Robert Sprecher’s
1965 essay concerning the Court’s egregious misconstrual of gun rights with gusto, and
its members wrote a number of articles and books condemning the Court’s interpretation
of the Second Amendment as inconsistent with the vision of the Founders and individual
freedom.5 For example, Eugene Volokh, a Federalist Society member, wrote in a 1998 law
review article that, in contrast to standard liberal interpretations of the Second Amendment
which emphasize the justificatory “well-regulated militia” clause, a proper reading in its
original historical context would instead emphasize the operative “right of the people”
clause.6 This reading of the Second Amendment was then lifted nearly verbatim, and
Volokh’s article directly cited, by Justice Scalia in the majority opinion of District of
Columbia v. Heller that famously did away with the reigning interpretation of the Second
Amendment as a collective right in favor of the conservative, individual right view. 7
Such examples of conservative justices making use of the intellectual resources and
arguments of Federalist Society members, whether through citations in court opinions or
even unabashed plagiarism, abound in Hollis-Brusky’s account. In a telling and creative
passage, she argues that perhaps the best evidence of the power Federalist Society
scholarship has had on conservative judges is that they no longer need to directly cite
2. AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES: THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY AND THE
CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION 13 (2015).
3. Id. at 16.
4. Id. at 13.
5. Id. at 31; Robert A. Sprecher, The Lost Amendment, 51 A.B.A. J. 665, 669 (1965).
6. HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 2, at 37. See Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 793 (1998).
7. 554 U.S. 570, 576–81 (2008).
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originalist scholarship in their decisions because they can simply refer back to Federalist
Society inspired decisions, now established as precedent, where that citational work was
already done.8
While these examples are compelling and, to some degree, demonstrate her main
theoretical point, Hollis-Brusky fortunately does not rest her case on a simple profusion of
citations on the part of conservative justices. The Federalist Society qua PEN also
functions as a means of judicial accountability, keeping conservative justices – often
themselves members – true to their principles and avoiding the well documented
phenomenon of “judicial drift” where conservative justices moderate their positions over
time.9 While conservative justices may not be accountable to the Federalist Society in the
formal sense of the word (they will not be voted out of office or have their campaigns
defunded like a member of Congress), they must reckon with the informal court of opinion
and esteem of their conservative colleagues if they wish to continue participating in the
Federalist Society and be seen as its standard bearer on the bench.
In an interesting example of this dynamic, a concurrence with the majority penned
by Chief Justice John Roberts in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission argued
for a uniquely originalist (that is to say, Federalist Society-derived) understanding of
“judicial restraint.”10 While legal conservatives often argue for the importance of stare
decisis on quasi-Burkean, incrementalist grounds, many members of the Federalist Society
developed an understanding of original intent consistent with judicial “activism” and
overturning precedent (though not all, and Hollis-Brusky does an excellent job describing
this internal debate in detail). If the extant precedent violates the principles of an originalist
Constitution, they argue, then the best way to save the rule of law is to overturn such
precedent and reestablish a legal interpretation consistent with the original intent of the
Founders. Roberts, Hollis-Brusky argues, did just that in Citizens United when he claimed
that “fidelity” to an unconstitutional precedent does violence to the “constitutional
ideal.”11 According to Hollis-Brusky, Robert’s opinion is best understood as a kind of
signal to the Federalist Society that he is willing to take on board their creative
reformulation of judicial restraint, thereby encouraging Society members to try more
originalist cases, all the while keeping himself in the Federalist Society’s good graces. 12
These claims of pseudo-oversight on the part of the Federalist Society are intriguing
and intuitively compelling, but difficult to prove. While Hollis-Brusky gestures toward an
interesting dynamic at work between judges and the Federalist Society, I would have liked
her to spend more time empirically demonstrating this accountability. As it stands, she
only demonstrates this through remarks from interviews of Federalist Society members
who claim to have chided Scalia, for example, after he ruled in a way they found
unfavorable.13 Or, as is the case with Roberts in Citizens United, generally minimalist
justices adopting originalist positions. One can imagine a host of other plausible
8. HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 2, at 113.
9. Id. at 156.
10. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
11. HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 2, at 86 (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 378–79 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring)).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 155.
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explanations for the latter beyond “signaling” (perhaps Roberts was simply convinced),
and it is unclear what concrete effects the condemnation from Federalist Society members,
even prominent ones, would have on a conservative giant like Scalia which would compel
him to change his mind. Put another way, this aspect of her argument suffers both from
selection bias and an unclear sense of the mechanisms of influence. These points are not
damning critiques by any measure, but are instead born of a desire to have seen more from
Hollis-Brusky to flesh out this novel, if controversial, aspect of her argument.
The third, and arguably most important, aspect of her argument is fortunately far
more compelling. Not only does the Federalist Society generate the intellectual resources
and oversight necessary for a conservative “counter-revolution” – it also creates the
broader political and intellectual climate necessary for this change by normalizing once
stigmatized sets of intellectual commitments. Originalism, once widely condemned and
chastised as an incoherent and wholly unworkable set of jurisprudential commitments, has
taken on new life and a new sort of respectability thanks in no small part – and perhaps
the largest part – to the work of Federalist Society members and their influence on judges.
This new lease on intellectual life has been the catalyst for fundamental constitutional
changes that reverberate throughout the whole of American political life. Conservative law
students, once stigmatized for holding originalist views, now have access to a national
organization of likeminded students and practicing attorneys. Once those students
themselves become lawyers, judges, or politicians, they further naturalize conservative and
originalist jurisprudence as a respectable form of constitutional interpretation.
Perhaps the clearest example of this is the extent to which even liberal justices have
started to both seriously contend with originalist arguments and make originalist claims of
their own. Justice Stevens, for instance, made a spirited dissent in Citizens United, arguing
that moving too quickly to overturn precedent violated the original intent of the
Constitution.14 For Hollis-Brusky, this is evidence that the Federalist Society has radically
changed the nature of the discourse circulating at the Supreme Court and in constitutional
proceedings around the country. Liberal justices are unlikely to quaff the originalist KoolAid anytime soon, but they are increasingly submerged in it, and so must contend with its
ideas and arguments, often on its own terms. As conservative, libertarian, and Tea Party
styled politicians take this originalist discourse into the mainstream, Hollis-Brusky makes
a strong case that these ideas would not have the force or discursive currency they do on
the contemporary right (and, increasingly, in the broader polity) were it not for the efforts
of the Federalist Society and its many members.
Jefferson Decker’s The Other Rights Revolution presents a richly textured and
meticulously researched look into the development of conservative public interest law
firms throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and their effects on the direction and shape of the
new conservative movement. His central argument provides a fresh take on the
development of the new right’s policy agenda: much of what we now take for granted as
paradigmatically “conservative” policy positions, such as a firm commitment to individual
property rights and free markets at the expense of government regulation, has its roots in
the local politics of western states that pitted environmentalist groups and their public
14. HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 2, at 87 (citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 948–58 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)).
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interest legal allies against business interests in the latter quarter of the twentieth century.
Conservatives then adopted the tactics of their enemies, creating their own public interest
firms and creatively reformulating the rights discourses of the “new left” social movements
of the 1960s to instead defend the economic rights of individuals to free exchange in the
marketplace. Once conservatives came into national power under President Ronald
Reagan, the leaders of these conservative public interest firms were placed in positions of
influence in Washington, thereby shaping the Reagan administration’s policy priorities
and commitments – policy commitments that have since become naturalized by
conservative politicians nationwide.
Decker’s account begins with a description of the well-known story of the
development of the Great Society regulatory state. Under President Lyndon Johnson,
American liberals began thinking about more than mere economic prosperity, turning their
attention toward social problems like poverty and environmental degradation that were
often seen as a negative byproduct of excessive affluence. Part and parcel of this shift was
the creation of so-called “public interest” law firms like Ralph Nader’s “Public Interest
Research Groups” that took on issues like product safety regulation and environmental
protection at the expense of business interests.15 These firms soon developed into a cottage
industry, attracting idealistic law school graduates who rejected the corporate law track,
and often made cozy alliances with liberal bureaucrats and judges. Their success resulted
in no small part from “fee shifting,” whereby public interest firms were entitled to
attorney’s fees and other expenses related to a victorious suit so long as it was
demonstrated that the result served the public good, which alleviated the imbalance of
financial resources between big business and these upstart non-profit firms.16 It was in
response to these new liberal public interest firms that conservative-minded lawyers began
to organize their own with the intent to fight liberals at their own game.
Through the 1970s, following the lead of conservative lawyers (and former Supreme
Court Justice) like Lewis F. Powell and free market businessmen like Joseph Coors,
conservative lawyers in California and Colorado formed their own public interest firms to
challenge the constitutional basis of social and economic regulation. In California, attorney
and Reagan aide Ronald Zumbrun formed the “Pacific Legal Foundation” to combat
environmental regulations, which he and other likeminded conservatives argued impinged
on the rights of individuals and businesses. His first, ultimately failed, case involved
challenging the California Coastal Commission’s restriction on Viktoria Consiglio, a
private citizen, that prevented her from building a house on coastal property. Meanwhile,
in Colorado, Joseph Coors bankrolled the creation of the “Mountain States Legal
Foundation,” led by James G. Watt, as part of the so-called “sagebrush rebellion” of
western states against the heavy hand of federal regulation of public lands. Their opening
salvo was Valdez v. Applegate where Mountain States demanded review of the
environmental impact statements related to the reduction of grazing leases to ranchers. 17
The courts agreed, thereby opening a space for conservative firms to make use of the same

15. JEFFERSON DECKER, THE OTHER RIGHTS REVOLUTION: CONSERVATIVE LAWYERS AND THE REMAKING
OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 27 (2016).
16. Id. at 33.
17. Id. at 85 (citing Valdez v. Applegate, 616 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1980)).
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delaying and reviewing tactics of the public interest left to challenge federal regulation.
These cases, Decker argues, demonstrate that the conservative political
commitment, that “America need[s] less public property and more private property, and
that private property needed better protection against government interference in its
owner’s rights,” emerged from the particular political conditions of these western states
and their battle against federal regulation of public land, a political contest impossible to
reproduce in other areas of the country like the south and east where federal land holdings
are minimal.18 Conservative anti-statism, at least in terms of its specific policy content,
owes its origins to these legal battles initiated by conservative public interest firms in the
1970s where they turned the tactics of the public interest left against state regulation of
private individuals.
This political jiu-jitsu continued with the election of Ronald Reagan, and many of
the leaders of these conservative public interest firms found themselves in positions of
political influence in Washington. As conservative firms expanded and conservative
lawyers took up prominent positions in the bureaucracy, they began to articulate “an
almost dizzying number of conservative counter-rights” that would defend the interests of
majorities, aggrieved by imposition of minority rights, from the “original” rights
revolution of the 1960s.19 The assertion of counter-rights troubled many legal
conservatives, however, as they feared biting the fruit from the tree of liberalism – using
state power to enforce individual rights – would undo the very foundational principles of
restraint that conservatives had sought to instill in government all along. This internal
division among conservative lawyers was never fully resolved, but those in favor of
judicial and state activism prevailed, redefining the concept of rights through a series of
successful court cases and bureaucratic policies to include an individual’s right to
economic exchange in a marketplace free from most government regulation. 20 As Decker
puts it in the book’s concluding paragraph, “Conservatives could not turn back the clock
on the rights revolution. But they could make a rights revolution of their own.” 21
Conservative lawyers had successfully transformed the political machinery and discursive
resources of the new left to undo the regulatory state it helped build on the basis of a
reformulated notion of economic rights.
Since its formal designation decades ago, American political development (“APD”)
has had an uneasy relationship with the dominant strains of political science scholarship.
Often derided as “mere” description or a-theoretical antiquarianism by those who
emphasize the “science” side of political science, Hollis-Brusky’s account demonstrates
that the choice between theory building and thick description is a false one. She combines
the methods of historically oriented scholars – in-depth interviews, archival research, and
an attention to discursive meaning – with a clear and well-reasoned theoretical apparatus
in the PEN. Every major case is accompanied by a chart demonstrating the lines of
influence at work between the Federalist Society, academic journals, judges, and their
aides. These numerical correlations are bolstered by thick contextual evidence from the

18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 94.
Id. at 108.
DECKER, supra note 15, at 181–82.
Id. at 227.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol53/iss2/19

6

Magee: Rights and Right-Wing Lawyers
MAGEE, BOOK REVIEW_FINAL (293) (CORRECTED) (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

RIGHTS AND RIGHT-WING LAWYERS

3/5/2018 10:19 AM

299

actors themselves within the Federalist Society. This evidence is, in turn, used to further
refine the theoretical apparatus around which her argument is structured. While at times
the connection between her empirical evidence and theory building project is strained,
such as the unsatisfying argument concerning judicial accountability, on the whole she
produces a compelling argument, inducted from the evidence, as to why the Federalist
Society ought to be considered a PEN. Other APD scholars interested in the ideological
and discursive influence of elite social groups like the Federalist Society will find the
notion of a PEN quite useful in making sense of their own pet influence groups. The
concept of a PEN itself represents a bridge to other sub-disciplines, like international
relations, and can serve as a means for better intra-discipline communication and
cooperation.
If Hollis-Brusky represents the more “theoretical” side of APD scholarship, then
Decker’s work stands firmly at the other pole. It is a full-throated, detailed narration of the
rise of the new legal right that lets the argument emerge from the details and eschews any
theoretical scaffolding. This is at once the greatest strength and weakness of The Other
Rights Revolution. On the one hand, Decker’s account is packed full of historical nuance,
detail, and the rich inner lives of his eccentric conservative protagonists. These features
produce an engaging, insightful, and often times entertaining narrative. On the other hand,
it is often unclear to what end all of this historical detail is aimed. It is not until the final
chapter that the reader begins to gain a sense of the central argument of the book: that
conservative lawyers developed a new concept of individual economic rights, derived from
the political battles of western lawyers who took up the tactics of the public interest left,
that was used by conservatives in power to push back against the regulatory state. As a
result, this argument gains the appearance of an afterthought, rushed in at the last minute
to tie a too-neat bow around a bursting bundle of historical detail. This is not to say that
the argument is unconvincing. Rather, the work would have benefitted from a clearer sense
of the payoff of Decker’s wonderfully researched narrative at its outset, and throughout its
various episodes.
In terms of their contributions to the ever-growing literature on the rise of the new
American right, both works share a number of strengths and novel contributions, but they
also share, in my view, an unfortunate limitation. Perhaps the greatest strength of each is
the extent to which they demonstrate the tension-riddled development of the conservative
movement. All too often the new right is treated as an inevitable and cohesive monolith,
unified in its ideological and political vision. In contrast, both works treat the new right
and its lawyers as a collection of idiosyncratic individuals; unified to a certain extent, but
far from wholly cohesive.
Perhaps the best example of this attention to ambiguity, present in both accounts, is
the division between traditional conservative legal scholars who preached restraint and
saw “judicial activism” as the cardinal sin of America’s liberal turn, and those on the new
legal right who advocated an embrace of judicial activism for conservative and originalist
ends. This split echoes a broader division within the conservative movement between the
“traditionalists” and “libertarians” described by many scholars of the American right who
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also analyze this time period.22 While both authors claim that the Burkean, traditionalist
side lost that battle, to their great credit they do not then essentialize the legal right as only
made up of judicial activists. Instead, they both demonstrate that this tension continues to
exist, and in fact might now inform liberal justices’ opposition to their conservative
counterparts, as Hollis-Brusky describes in Justice Stevens’ dissent in Citizens United.
Extending from this debate about judicial activism, both authors also detail the ways
the new right grappled with the issue of state power generally. Once in office or in other
positions of power, conservative lawyers tied themselves in philosophical knots about how
to wield the very powers of a federal government they had made a career of resisting and
trying to curtail. The results of this debate, detailed by both authors, demonstrates why we
ought not take for granted the policy positions of conservatives as natural or necessary
extensions of their philosophical commitments. For example, the notion that wielding state
power can in fact further originalist ends is a counterintuitive position precisely because it
was constructed and formulated within the heat of the internal debate among conservative
lawyers about what, precisely, they ought to do with this newfound federal power. Scholars
of the right who emphasize its high principles should learn from this example and refocus
their attention to the political contestation among actors on the ground, rather than the
supposedly fixed principles of their political theory.
In addition to their attention to tension, both authors spend a great deal of time
emphasizing the interpersonal connections animating the new legal right. While ideas and
beliefs are of course important, they are useless without actual individuals who hold them.
Hollis-Brusky emphasizes time and again the critical importance of the ordinary personal
interactions – the dinner parties, conferences, and conversations over drinks – that make
the Federalist Society such a powerful force in American politics. Likewise, Decker
continually demonstrates how the friendships, camaraderie, and business connections of
western state conservatives translated into increased positions of influence for the budding
group of public interest conservative lawyers. To their great credit, neither author indulges
the impulse to abstract these connections to something like “social capital,” and instead
emphasize the critical role of context and nuance that gives these connections their force.
Other scholars, beyond those who study the American right, can learn from this focus on
the power of the personal.
While the strengths described above are enough to merit serious attention to these
two works from scholars of the American right, both books, ironically, suffer from their
own inattention to the broader scholarship on American conservatism. Specifically, I am
left unconvinced by both author’s arguments when articulated in their most ambitious
form: that the legal right and its various organizations, whether the Federalist Society or
public interest firms, are the central motivating force behind either the new right’s
programmatic agenda or its ideological commitments. Both authors unnecessarily veer too
far in this direction in an effort to distinguish their works as novel accounts of the rise of
the new right. While this is true insofar as they address fresh empirical content in the form
of conservative lawyers, neither spends much time situating themselves among other
accounts of the conservative movement (though Decker comes close in his discussion of
22. For a classic analysis of this tension and an account of its resolution among conservative intellectuals,
see JEROME L. HIMMELSTEIN, TO THE RIGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CONSERVATISM (1990).
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the importance of western states in his epilogue). As a result, their works appear as
arguments in a vacuum, and the legal right by extension looks like an autonomous force
free from influence or interaction with the broader conservative turn of the latter twentieth
century. This de-contextualization of the legal right from the broader conservative
movement is ironic and surprising, considering that both author’s accounts spend so much
effort to emphasize the importance of context in other ways.
To be fair, both authors also emphasize less ambitious claims about the role
conservative lawyers played in the reformation of American jurisprudence and
constitutional interpretation. Such arguments are compelling and surely valuable to those
only interested in American legal development. However, insofar as these books attempt
to explain something central to the rise of American conservatism, their lack of a firm
sense of place within the literature on the modern American right makes that aspect of
their work ring hollow. Attention to the legal right is surely a needed and novel
intervention, but it is certainly not the whole story of America’s embrace of conservative
governance, just as conservative lawyers may not be the prime movers of conservative
ideology. Put another way, it is difficult for a reader to accept their more ambitious claims
in the absence of some sense why lawyers were more important to the rise of the new right
than other commonly cited forces. Scholars of the American conservative movement will
thus likely see these works as an unfortunate missed opportunity. Rather than using the
lens of elite conservative lawyers as a means to better flesh out the story of the new right
in conversation with other, potentially competing, accounts, Hollis-Brusky and Decker
instead present two excellent, but atomized, stories of American conservatism.
In spite of this criticism, both works present superbly researched and clearly
articulated accounts of the dynamics and development of the new legal right. Students of
American political development, public law, and the American right will find these works
both essential and stimulating. With these two books, no account of the modern American
conservative movement will be complete without grappling with the clear and powerful
role played by conservative lawyers and their professional organizations.
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